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Special Interest Money: A Threat to
Democratic Government
Senator David L. Boren*
In this 200th-anniversary year of the United States Constitution,
we should renew our focus upon the problems facing our electoral
process caused by the influence of money in politics and on the divi-
siveness this money promotes. The entire system is out of balance.
Campaign spending has increased at an alarming rate: In 1976, the
average cost to win a seat in the United States Senate was about
$600,000, while ten years later, that cost has risen to over $3,000,000.1
Such a startling statistic gives strength to the argument made by for-
mer Solicitor General Archibald Cox, one of the foremost constitu-
tional lawyers in the nation, when he said, "Today the public sees a
'For Sale' sign tacked upon each congressional seat up for election." 2
The 1986 congressional-election cycle illustrated the exploding cost
of campaigns and the dubious sources of funds for those campaigns.
The most disturbing aspect of those elections, and one that will be
even more obvious in the 1988 elections, was the increased influence
of special interest money through the proliferation of political action
committees (PAC's).3 Ironically, PAC's originally grew out of cam-
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from 1966-74; Chairman, Department of Government, Oklahoma Baptist University;
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Oklahoma College of Law, 1968; received master's degree in government, with honors,
from Oxford University (Rhodes Scholar), 1965; received bachelor's degree from Yale
University, 1963; Phi Beta Kappa.
1. J. Cantor & T. Durbin, Campaign Financing 5 (Mar. 9, 1987) (issue brief avail-
able from Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress); Weeks, Bribes,
Gratuities and the Congress: The Institutionalized Corruption of the Political Process,
the Impotence of Criminal Law to Reach It and a Proposal for Change, 13 J. LEGIS. 123
(1986). During the 1983-84 election cycle, congressional candidates received 26 percent
($105 million dollars) of their total contributions from political action committees. Id
at 126; see also 97 L.A. Daily J., Aug. 16, 1984, at 3, col. 4.
2. Statement by Archibald Cox, Solicitor General, Press Conference in the U.S.
Senate Press Gallery (Oct. 25, 1985).
3. For a general discussion of PAC's and their effect upon the political system see
paign reform legislation of the post-Watergate era.4 Now PAC's have
become a serious problem themselves.
The rising tide of special-interest money from PAC's contributes to
the fundamental problem that there is simply too much money in the
system. Without a structure by which we can reform the system
through overall expenditure limits,5 we risk the legitimacy of our
democratic political process.
As millions of dollars have rolled into the campaign coffers of
members of Congress, the conduct of our elected officials has
changed dramatically. Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin, while
debating the Boren-Goldwater amendment6 last year on the Senate
floor, made the following comment:
... the payoff by public officials for the PAC contributions they receive ...
may not come in a vote. It may come in a speech not delivered ... in a col-
league not influenced. It may come in a witness not invited to testify before a
committee. It may come in hiring a key staff member for a committee who is
sympathetic to the PAC. Or it may come in laying off or transferring a staff
member who is unsympathetic to the PAC.7
What is even more disturbing is that in scheduling time for votes in
the Congress, consideration is given to the fund-raising schedule that
night. Frequently, two- or three-hour "windows" are left open in the
Senate's schedule to allow members to go to each other's fund-raiser
that evening. It is clear that members of Congress are spending time
raising money to fund outrageously expensive campaigns-time
which they should be spending in working to solve the pressing
problems facing our nation.
Another alarming issue is that this out-of-state money machine,
coming from both business and labor groups, is discouraging new peo-
ple with fresh ideas from getting involved in politics. Nearly eighty
percent of PAC funds goes to incumbents rather than to challeng-
B. SHEPPARD, RETHINKING CONGRESSIONAL REFORM (1985) (discusses, among other
things, the rise to power of PAC's); E. HANDLER & J. MULKERN, BUSINESS IN POLITICS
(1982) (an analysis of PAC's and their effect on the political system).
4. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 93-443 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 18, 23, and 47 U.S.C. (1974)) (defining PAC's as
multi-candidate political committees).
5. Any expenditure limits that are developed must stay within the confines of
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per
curiam). In Buckley, the Court upheld establishment of the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act of 1971, as amended in 1974. The Court held that the limitations imposed on
contributions were constitutional. Further, the disclosure and record-keeping provi-
sions of the Act were upheld as necessary for enforcement of the Act. Finally, the
Court invalidated the Act's expenditure ceilings as a violation of the first amendment.
6. S. Amend. 1168, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). This amendment contained the
same legislative language as S. 1806, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). S. 1806 amended the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 by changing certain contribution limits for con-
gressional elections. In addition, it amended the Communications Act of 1934, 47
U.S.C. § 315 (1934), regarding the broadcasting of campaign material by or for candi-
dates for federal elective office.
7. 132 CONG. REC. § 11,163 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1986) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
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ers.8 The recipients of these funds are usually members of powerful
committees in Washington to whom the lobbyists need to gain access.
New candidates may be able to do well in their home states or dis-
tricts, but they are often discouraged from running because they do
not want to fight the large out-of-state PAC donations to the
incumbents.
It is obvious to even casual observers that PAC's are further frag-
menting an already destabilized Congress. PAC's do not rate mem-
bers of Congress on their overall records, but only on the basis of a
few votes that affect their economic interest. We face momentous de-
cisions involving the future of our country-issues which demand a
selfless commitment to the national interest. It is no surprise that it
is difficult to form a national consensus when campaigns are increas-
ingly being financed by special interest groups.
No one can expect PAC's to lead the fight for compromises or sac-
rifices for the good of the entire nation. Senate Minority Leader
Robert Dole gave the public a candid and unsettling peek into the
system by his comment that when PAC's contribute to a candidate
"they expect something in return other than good government."9
Ever since I first voiced concern about this problem in 1978, I have
heard the argument that PAC's are really broadening political partic-
ipation. In truth, while the original base of contributors to PAC's
may be broad, it is usually Washington lobbyists, not grassroots con-
tributors, who decide how to distribute their funds. Nothing requires
PAC's to conduct a vote of contributors to decide where the money
goes. Even data collected from the 1980 elections, which was summa-
rized in a report written by the University of Michigan's Center for
Political Studies, indicated that the average contributor to a political
action committee is much less informed and less politically active
than those who contribute directly to a candidate.10
In response to this attack on our democratic process, I have intro-
duced legislation that would put a limit on Senate general election
spending through a voluntary system of partial public financing."'
8. Report by the Democratic Study Group 3 (Oct. 22, 1985) (Richard Conlon, Ex-
ecutive Director; Hon. James L. Oberstar, Chairman).
9. Hunt, Cash Politics, Special Interest Money Increasingly Influences What Con-
gress Enacts, Wall St. J., July 26, 1982, at 1, col. 6.
10. Prof. Frank Sorauf, University of Minnesota, What Price PAC's? (1984) study
by the Twentieth Century Fund, New York.
11. S. 2 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) seeks to amend the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act of 1971 by providing for a voluntary system of spending limits and partial
public financing of Senate general election campaigns. It also seeks to limit contribu-
This plan is similar to the current system for our Presidential elec-
tions.12 It would also put an aggregate limit on PAC contributions to
Congressional candidates, close various loopholes in the contribution
limits, and put a check and balance on the increasing independent ex-
penditures. While the Boren-Goldwater amendment of last year ad-
dressed the symptoms of this growing illness, the bill that Senate
Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd and I introduced, S. 2, attempts to
attack the illness directly. We now have over forty co-sponsors with
the first hearings scheduled for March, 1988.
With looming budget deficits, a frightening trade imbalance, and
grave concerns over foreign policy, now is the time when the need
for national leadership and consensus is uniquely great. Congress
must promote integrity within itself and unity among our citizens,
rather than falling into the trap of division promoted by our system
of having special economic interests or single-issue groups finance
our campaigns.
We have some serious housecleaning to do. The problem becomes
more serious with each passing election, and politicians become more
and more addicted to special interest money. Congress is unaccus-
tomed to voting against its own special interests, but in this case we
should be able to see the depth of public concern and the threat to
our democratic form of government.
tions by multicandidate political committees. As of July, 1987, S. 2 had the following
senatorial support: Sen. Brock Adams, Washington; Sen. Max Baucus, Montana; Sen.
Joe Biden, Delaware; Sen. Jeff Bingaman, New Mexico; Sen. David L. Boren,
Oklahoma; Sen. Bill Bradley, New Jersey; Sen. Dale Bumpers, Arkansas; Sen. Quentin
Burdick, North Dakota; Sen. Robert C. Byrd, West Virginia; Sen. John Chafee, Rhode
Island; Sen. Lawton Chiles, Florida; Sen. Kent Conrad, North Dakota; Sen. Alan Cran-
ston, California; Sen. Thomas Daschle, South Dakota; Sen. Dennis DeConcini, Arizona;
Sen. Alan Dixon, Illinois; Sen. Wyche Fowler, Georgia; Sen. Albert Gore, Jr., Tennes-
see; Sen. Bob Graham, Florida; Sen. Tom Harkin, Iowa; Sen. Daniel Inouye, Hawaii;
Sen. J. Bennett Johnston, Louisiana; Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Massachusetts; Sen.
John Kerry, Massachusetts; Sen. Patrick Leahy, Vermont; Sen. Carl Levin, Michigan;
Sen. Frank Lovtenberg, New Jersey; Sen. Spark M. Matsunaga, Hawaii; Sen. John
Melcher, Montana; Sen. Howard Metzenbaum, Ohio; Sen. Barbara Mikulski, Mary-
land; Sen. George Mitchell, Maine; Sen. Daniel Moynihan, New York; Sen. Sam Nunn,
Georgia; Sen. Claiborne Pell, Rhode Island; Sen. William Proxnire, Wisconsin; Sen.
David Pryor, Arkansas; Sen. Harry Reid, Nevada; Sen. Donald Riegle, Jr., Michigan;
Sen. John Rockefeller, West Virginia; Sen. Terry Sanford, North Carolina; Sen. Paul
Sarbanes, Maryland; Sen. Jim Sasser, Tennessee; Sen. Paul Simon, Illinois; Sen. Rob-
ert Stafford, Vermont; Sen. John Stennis, Mississippi; Sen. Timothy Wirth, Colorado.
At the date of publication, S.2 was being considered by the full Senate. Opponents
of S.2 engaged in a filibuster of the Bill. On July 1, 1987, I presented a new compro-
mise amendment which involved a system of voluntary spending limits with no direct
public finance. I expect that S.2, together with my new compromise amendment, will
be voted on in July, 1987.
12. See Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9013 (Supp.
1986); Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9031-9042
(Supp. 1986).
